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This study seeks to reconcile traditional sociological 
views of the corporate board as an instrument of elite 
cohesion with recent evidence of greater board activism 
and control over top management. We propose that 
CEO-directors may typically support fellow CEOs by 
impeding increased board control over management but 
that CEO-directors may also foster this change if they 
have experienced it in their own corporation. Drawing on 
social exchange theory, we develop and test the argu- 
ment that these CEO-directors may experience a reversal 
in the basis for generalized social exchange with other 
top managers from one of deference and support to one 
of independence and control. Using data from a large 
sample of major U.S. corporations over a recent ten-year 
period, we show (1) how CEO-directors "defect" from the 
network of mutually supportive corporate leaders, (2) 
how defections have diffused across organizations and 
over time, and (3) how this has contributed to increased 
board control, as measured by changes in board struc- 
ture, diversification strategy, and contingent compensa- 
tion. We also provide evidence that a social exchange 
perspective can explain the diffusion of these changes 
better than more conventional perspectives on network 
diffusion that emphasize imitation or learning.' 
With few exceptions, organizational researchers and corpo- 
rate governance experts have historically viewed corporate 
boards of directors as "rubber stamps" for management 
initiatives (Herman, 1981) or as "tools" of top management 
(Pfeffer, 1972: 219). From this viewpoint, boards are popu- 
lated either by (1) inside directors who can ill afford to 
criticize their superiors or themselves, (2) uninformed 
outsiders who are unable to evaluate top management, or 
(3) more knowledgeable outside directors who are CEOs 
themselves and whose empathy for their fellow chief 
executive officers may diminish their willingness to monitor 
them actively. Interlocking directorships among top manag- 
ers have also traditionally been viewed as contributing to a 
cohesive "inner circle" of organizational elites accountable 
only to themselves (Useem, 1984). From this traditional 
perspective, overlapping board memberships provide a 
communication network for managerial elites that helps to 
preserve their corporate power (Useem, 1984; Davis, 1991; 
Mizruchi, 1996). 
More recently, however, the business press has used 
numerous vivid cases to illustrate a dramatic shift toward 
increased board activism and control over top management 
(e.g., Fortune, 1993; Business Week, 1994). This apparent 
change among large corporations is not easily reconcilable 
with the depiction of corporate boards as a passive group 
representing a cohesive inner circle of corporate leaders, 
since it suggests that boards are increasingly likely to act 
independently of top management's preferences. Recent 
attempts to explain the causes of this change toward 
increased board monitoring, or internal corporate control 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990), have usually referred to external 
forces, notably increased activism by large, institutional 
investors (Fortune, 1993; Davis and Thompson, 1994). 
Several recent empirical studies suggest, however, that the 
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magnitude of institutional investor ownership does not 
necessarily increase the willingness of boards to challenge 
management (e.g., Daily, 1996; Kim and Ocasio, 1995; 
Sundaramurthy, 1996; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). While 
institutional investors may be able to exert their will on 
specific issues where they have voting power, it is not clear 
whether and how they can overcome longstanding social 
relationships and norms of mutual support that are assumed 
to exist between managers and directors. 
The present study proposes a more comprehensive explana- 
tion of the rise in board independence that takes into 
account the social exchange relationships among corporate 
leaders, bringing into question the cohesiveness of the inner 
circle. While we do not deny that macro-social forces such 
as institutional shareholder activism may have played a role 
in sparking greater board independence from management in 
large U.S. corporations, we suggest that the diffusion of 
board independence may have resulted from micro-mecha- 
nisms relating to social and psychological dynamics within 
the inner circle of corporate leaders. 
Outside directors who are themselves CEOs of other large 
corporations may play a pivotal role in determining whether a 
board has a passive or an active orientation (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989: 18), and they may thus have a more complex 
role in corporate governance than previously assumed in the 
literature. Specifically, we propose that although CEO- 
directors may typically support fellow CEOs by impeding 
increased board control over management, CEO-directors 
experiencing increased board control in their own corpora- 
tions may also experience a reversal in their perceived basis 
for social exchange with other top managers. This change in 
the norms of reciprocity underlying generalized exchange 
could then lead CEO-directors to "defect" from the network 
of corporate leaders. This study shows how these specific 
instances of "defection" from a previously mutually support- 
ive network have diffused across organizations and over 
time, and how this has created the current situation of 
increased board independence in large U.S. corporations. 
When prior governance research has examined diffusion 
processes, it has been to establish the spread of mecha- 
nisms for increased managerial entrenchment such as 
poison pills or golden parachutes (e.g., Davis, 1991, 1992; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1994). Governance researchers have 
not considered how mechanisms for increased board 
independence or control may diffuse through an interorgani- 
zational network. This may be attributable to the fact that 
most researchers typically view board interlocks in terms of 
a social cohesion model or "a general communication 
system" that "allows firms to learn about their business 
environment" (Davis, 1992: 8). With respect to corporate 
governance, network ties are thought to spread information 
about mechanisms that protect the inner circle of business 
elites from market discipline (Useem, 1984). Increased board 
independence, however, can weaken rather than protect the 
inner circle, and thus its diffusion may not be easily ex- 
plained by traditional network perspectives. 
In this study we develop a new perspective on network ties 
among corporate elites that emphasizes the generalized 
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1 
There are several alternative theoretical 
explanations that are sometimes invoked 
in prior governance research to explain 
why boards would generally defer to 
CEOs. One is that outside directors feel 
indebted to a CEO who has offered them 
a directorship position and are therefore 
likely to support the CEO (Main, O'Reilly, 
and Wade, 1995). Such a cooptation view 
differs from ours in that it takes a strictly 
dyadic and intraorganizational focus (i.e., 
a specific director owes a CEO for the 
board appointment) and thus does not 
address the spread of greater or lesser 
board control across firms. 
Defections 
social exchange relationships that exist between CEO- 
directors and top managers and how social and psychologi- 
cal factors may affect the dynamics of that relationship. This 
perspective suggests that generalized norms of reciprocity 
among corporate leaders and changes in those norms can 
impede or foster the diffusion of board independence. We 
also control for the conventional communication perspec- 
tives on diffusion described above, thus enabling us to 
distinguish support for the social exchange perspective on 
diffusion developed in this study from alternative explana- 
tions. We then examine the generalizability of our framework 
to explain the diffusion of two other changes reflecting 
increased board independence that have generally been 
considered inimical to managerial preferences and thought to 
have been driven by external pressures: decreased corporate 
diversification and increased compensation contingency. We 
test hypotheses using event history analyses of changes in 
board structure, corporate strategy, and CEO compensation 
among the largest U.S. corporations over a ten-year period. 
THEORY 
Reciprocity and Board Independence 
Preventing increased board independence. One reason 
why boards have traditionally been characterized as rubber 
stamps or tools of top management is that outside directors 
who are also CEOs of their own firms may be reluctant to 
challenge or criticize CEOs on whose boards they sit (Mace, 
1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Lawler, 1990). We propose 
that generalized norms of reciprocity among CEOs who also 
serve as outside board members may represent a primary, 
social psychological mechanism hindering increased board 
independence. The principle of reciprocity refers to a rule of 
behavior in social exchange situations, and the more com- 
monly used phrase "norm of reciprocity" highlights the 
social obligation underlying the principle. Gouldner (1960) 
used the term to refer to the mutual reinforcement by two 
parties of each other's actions, but as Ekeh (1974: 48) noted, 
generalized norms of reciprocity refer to the situation in 
which "an individual feels obligated to reciprocate another's 
action, not by directly rewarding his benefactor, but by 
benefiting another actor implicated in a social exchange 
situation with his benefactor and himself." In such general- 
ized social exchange relationships, reciprocations are also 
generalized, involving multiple actors (rather than just two) 
and indirect (rather than direct) benefits.1 
In such a system of social interaction, A may help B, 
expecting reciprocation not from B but, rather, from another 
actor, such as C or D, sometime in the future. This implies 
that such a system relies on the existence of sufficient trust 
that the giver believes he or she will be reciprocated by 
someone else, somewhere else in the future. Levi-Strauss's 
(1969: 266) research on social exchange and reciprocity 
suggests that "for a system [of generalized exchange] to 
function harmoniously," exchange partners need to be "of 
equal status and prestige." In addition, social psychological 
research has shown that high levels of group solidarity or 
cohesion facilitate cooperative behavior among group 
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members (cf., Dawes, 1992) and that individuals benefitting 
from an altruistic or prosocial act are more likely to engage 
in similar behavior toward others, so that helping behavior 
spreads through a social structure (Krebs and Miller, 1985; 
Komorita, Hilty, and Parks, 1991). 
The CEO-director network is an arena likely to be character- 
ized by a generalized reciprocity among top managers and 
CEO-directors. First, given that corporate CEOs are a 
relatively homogenous and cohesive group (Useem, 1984), 
they may feel a generalized obligation to support fellow 
CEOs in board meetings and during periods of poor firm 
performance (Mace, 1971). Thus, CEOs enjoying minimal 
board independence at their home companies may, as 
CEO-directors, hinder any attempts to increase the indepen- 
dence of other boards on which they sit. In the context of 
the present study, the preceding discussion suggests the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on a 
board, the lower the likelihood of an increase in board indepen- 
dence. 
The diffusion of increased board independence. While the 
discussion thus far has emphasized how generalized 
reciprocity can result in cooperative behavior among individu- 
als, other possible outcomes, such as mutual noncooperative 
behavior or defection, are also possible (Axelrod, 1984). 
Similarly, while social solidarity may promote generalized 
reciprocal cooperation among individuals, it can likewise 
provide a context for generalized reciprocal "retaliation," 
defined broadly as the repayment of injurious or otherwise 
undesired acts, regardless of emotional content (i.e., 
retaliation simply represents one category of exchange 
reciprocity) (Gouldner, 1960: 172; Walster, Berscheid, and 
Walster, 1973). Where CEO-directors have experienced an 
increase in board independence at their home companies, 
their felt obligation to support fellow CEOs (i.e., by resisting 
increased independence) may diminish or even reverse 
itself. When generalized exchange partners are no longer of 
equal status and prestige, such inequality may "force a 
rupture" in the system of exchange (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 
266). As Ekeh (1974: 48) noted: "the principle of reciprocity 
has a built-in change-generating factor," since equality in 
social exchange is needed for continuity of social interaction; 
when this expectation is frustrated, the social exchange 
situation is threatened. Given that a CEO's power and 
influence is closely tied to his or her status among CEOs, a 
CEO-director who has lost power to the board in his or her 
home company may perceive himself or herself as unequal 
in status to those CEOs who enjoy greater control over their 
boards and thus greater influence over strategy, compensa- 
tion, or perquisites. While disempowered CEOs may 
alleviate the resultant inequality in several ways, one 
response is to diminish their support for CEOs in other 
organizations where they serve as outside directors, thus 
reducing the power and status of fellow corporate leaders 
and returning balance to the social exchange relationship. 
The preceding discussion suggests that CEO-directors 
subjected to increased board independence at their home 
companies may not only decrease their resistance to greater 
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Defections 
board control but may actually induce such changes in other 
boards on which they sit. Thus, while CEO-directors may 
typically help sustain CEO dominance over the board, 
effectively preventing greater board independence, they may 
spur increased independence when they have experienced it 
themselves, resulting in "chains of negative reciprocity" or 
retaliation (Collins, 1990: 419). In this way, increased board 
independence can spread through the director network of 
corporate leaders. As the prevalence of director experience 
with greater board independence increases, the board's 
orientation should tend toward greater independence and 
activism rather than passivity. This suggests the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on a 
board who have experienced an increase in board independence at 
their home companies, the greater the likelihood of such change in 
the focal company. 
Hypotheses 
Reciprocity and change in board structure. While it is 
difficult to observe and measure directly the level of board 
independence in large corporations, a number of structural 
variables have been used in the governance literature to 
assess differences in levels of board independence across 
organizations. We consider three such variables. Managerial 
hegemony theorists, agency theorists, and the business 
press have generally all argued that separation of the CEO 
and board chair positions (i.e., allocation of each position to 
separate individuals) enhances the board's independent 
monitoring capacity (Crystal, 1991; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; 
Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). In contrast, CEOs holding 
both positions are thought to possess greater formal 
authority and heightened informal power over board mem- 
bers (Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988). More generally, 
given that the board chairman is responsible for monitoring 
and evaluating CEO decision making, uniting both roles in 
one person represents a formalized conflict of interest. 
Similarly, separating these roles indicates an increase in 
board independence. This logic suggests the following 
hypotheses, consistent with propositions 1 and 2: 
Hypothesis 1 (Hi): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on 
a board, the lower the likelihood of a separation of the CEO and 
board chair positions in the firm. 
Hypothesis la (Hia): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors 
on a board who have experienced a separation of the CEO and 
board chair positions at their home companies, the greater the 
likelihood of a separation of the CEO and board chair positions in 
the firm. 
Agency theorists and advocates of board reform have also 
long maintained that outside directors are better able to 
control management decision making (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). Since insiders are "beholden to CEOs for their jobs" 
(Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988: 262), they may 
be less willing to challenge or override CEO initiatives when 
shareholder interests are threatened (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Kosnik, 1987). Outsiders may also be better positioned 
to evaluate managerial performance impartially (Beatty and 
Zajac, 1994). Thus, increases in the ratio of outside to inside 
directors can be viewed as reflecting increased board 
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independence from management. This suggests the follow- 
ing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on 
a board, the lower the likelihood of increases in the ratio of outside 
to inside directors. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors 
on a board who have experienced increases in the ratio of outside 
to inside directors at their home companies, the greater the 
likelihood of such an increase in the firm's board. 
While the two manifestations of board independence 
discussed above are based on the prevalence and allocation 
of formal board roles, independence may also be enhanced 
or reduced through more subtle, demographic mechanisms. 
Abundant evidence suggests that demographic similarly 
produces bias in evaluation decisions. For instance, Wayne 
and Liden (1995) showed how demographic similarity 
enhanced mutual affect in superior-subordinate dyads, 
resulting in more positive performance appraisals (see also 
Turban and Jones, 1988). By contrast, demographic dissimi- 
larity between board members and top managers should 
minimize bias and enhance independence and objectivity in 
decision control activities. Recent empirical evidence 
indicates that greater demographic distance between the 
CEO and the board can increase the tendency for directors 
to challenge managerial preferences on behalf of shareholder 
interests (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Accordingly, the 
appointment of demographically dissimilar new directors 
should enhance the board's attitudinal and social indepen- 
dence from management. In general, therefore, CEO- 
directors who have experienced a reduction in demographic 
similarity with the board at their home companies should 
undergo changes in their perceived social exchange relation- 
ships with CEOs of other companies on whose boards they 
sit who have not experienced this reduction. This suggests 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on 
a board, the lower the likelihood of an increase in demographic 
distance between the CEO and the board. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors 
on a board who have experienced an increase in demographic 
distance from the board at their home companies, the greater the 
likelihood of such an increase in the firm's board. 
Reciprocity and unrelated diversification. Social exchange 
processes may also influence the diffusion of other changes 
that are thought to reflect greater board independence and 
that have generally been considered aversive to top manage- 
ment, including reduction in unrelated diversification and 
greater compensation contingency. The pursuit of diversifica- 
tion as a corporate strategy has been the subject of increas- 
ing debate. According to both managerialist and agency 
researchers, top managers have personal incentives to 
pursue diversification beyond the level at which shareholder 
wealth is maximized (Hill and Snell, 1988; Jensen, 1989; 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). From these perspectives, 
top managers may diversify into largely unrelated businesses 
to enhance their personal power, compensation, and status 
(Marris, 1964), while stabilizing income streams and minimiz- 
ing employment risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Since stock- 
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Defections 
holders can diversify their investment portfolios more easily 
than CEOs can diversify their employment, shareholders 
should favor lower levels of unrelated diversification. One 
would expect that boards of directors, as representatives of 
shareholder interests, would resist management's attempts 
to diversify into largely unrelated businesses and would 
encourage the reduction of existing levels of diversification 
where possible. 
Jensen (1989) has suggested that passive boards have been 
unwilling to question or resist top management's prefer- 
ences for unrelated diversification. From our perspective, 
such passivity may be understood in terms of the existence 
of generalized norms of reciprocity among corporate leaders. 
To the degree that CEO-directors frequently empathize with 
the focal CEO's desire to minimize employment risk and 
stabilize income, while also perceiving a general obligation to 
support the preferences of fellow CEOs, the presence of 
CEO-directors on the board may inhibit board-initiated efforts 
to minimize or reduce unrelated diversification. At the same 
time, however, CEOs who have been forced into reducing 
unrelated diversification, thus sacrificing their personal 
preferences for risk reduction, power, and status, may seek 
to rectify perceived inequities by reducing their support for 
unrelated diversification or even actively advocating divesti- 
ture in those firms on whose boards they sit as directors. As 
a result, while CEO-directors may, under normal circum- 
stances, typically help sustain strategies of unrelated 
diversification, they may foster reductions in it when they 
have experienced it themselves. Taken together, and 
paralleling the discussion of board independence, we 
propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on a 
board, the lower the likelihood of a decrease in unrelated diversifi- 
cation. 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors 
on a board who have experienced a reduction in unrelated diversifi- 
cation at their home companies, the greater the likelihood of such 
change in the focal company. 
Reciprocity and compensation contingency. Contingent 
compensation contracts that link pay to firm performance 
serve to align the interests of CEOs as agents with the 
preferences of shareholders as principals, thus promoting 
shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). From an 
agency theory perspective, the provision of long-term 
incentives such as stock options, performance shares, or 
restricted stock is a primary mechanism by which corporate 
boards effect incentive alignment (Kerr and Kren, 1992; 
Gibbs, 1993; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). But a significant 
number of large U.S. corporations make only limited use of 
long-term incentive compensation in designing CEO compen- 
sation contracts (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), which West- 
phal and Zajac (1994) have attributed to managerial entrench- 
ment. From a normative agency theory perspective, CEOs as 
risk-averse agents prefer less risk in their compensation 
contracts (Harris and Raviv, 1979). By making compensation 
contingent on future firm performance, long-term incentives 
add uncertainty to a CEO's compensation. Moreover, 
stock-based compensation effectively increases the CEO's 
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non tradeable investment in the firm and reduces the 
diversification of his or her investment portfolio (Beatty and 
Zajac, 1994). 
To the extent that generalized norms of reciprocity among 
corporate leaders constitute a relatively fundamental source 
of CEO power over the board (as suggested above), having 
sympathetic CEO-directors on the board may be a primary 
mechanism by which CEOs avoid contingent compensation, 
thus inhibiting increased incentive alignment. By contrast, 
just as CEOs experiencing a decrease in unrelated diversifi- 
cation at their home companies may reduce their opposition 
to those changes elsewhere, CEO-directors ubjected to 
greater compensation contingency may likewise reduce their 
resistance to incentive compensation at other companies. 
Thus, norms of retaliation among CEO-directors may 
facilitate the spread of incentive alignment through the 
director network of corporate leaders. This suggests the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors on 
a board, the lower the likelihood of an increase in compensation 
contingency. 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The greater the proportion of CEO-directors 
on a board who have experienced an increase in compensation 
contingency at their home companies, the greater the likelihood of 
such a change in the focal firm. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
The population for this study included the largest U.S. 
industrial and service firms, as listed in the 1982 Forbes and 
Fortune 500 indexes The Forbes 500 uses multiple lists 
whose overlap depends on the specific size measure used; 
we included those firms that qualified according to two or 
more size measures. Firms were excluded from the final 
sample if complete demographic data were unavailable for 
more than one-quarter of the outside directors in each year 
or if complete diversification or compensation data were 
unavailable. This procedure yielded 422 companies. T-tests 
revealed no significant differences in size, measured as log 
of sales, or profitability between the initial and final samples. 
Data were collected for the years 1982 to 1992, inclusive. 
Academic research and anecdotal evidence suggest that 
increases in board independence, as manifested by control- 
enhancing changes in board structure, greater compensation 
contingency, and reductions in corporate diversification, may 
have accelerated during this period (Davis and Thompson, 
1994; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). While the spread of such 
changes has been attributed to increased activism by 
institutional investors during the 1980s, we analyze the 
effect of social exchange factors internal to the network of 
corporate leaders during this period. 
Information on CEO and board member characteristics, 
including the affiliations of CEO-directors, was obtained from 
the Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate 
Management, Standard and Poor's Register of Corporations, 
Directors, and Executives, and Who's Who in Finance and 
Industry; data on board structure and compensation were 
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Defections 
collected from proxy statements. Finally, we obtained 
diversification data from Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT 
Business Segment Tapes; size and performance data were 
provided by COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). 
Dependent Variables 
Board structure. To analyze the likelihood of a separation of 
the CEO and board chair positions (separation), we created a 
dichotomous variable, coded as 1 in a given year if the 
positions were separate in that year but not in the prior year, 
and 0 otherwise. Separation of the CEO and board chair 
positions often occurs when the CEO is replaced (Vancil, 
1987; Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988). As a result, a 
CEO-director's experience with separation may involve (1) 
having lost the CEO position as well as the board chair 
position, (2) having lost only the CEO position and remaining 
as board chair, or (3) having lost only the board chair position 
and remaining as CEO. In all three scenarios, however, the 
CEO witnesses separation of the two positions, experiences 
the associated increase in board power, and loses the status 
associated with holding both positions. Thus, we combined 
all three varieties of separation experience. A separate 
analysis indicated that when cases of separation accompany- 
ing CEO succession are removed (scenarios 1 and 2 above), 
the results reported below remain unchanged. 
Increases in the ratio of outside to inside directors (increased 
outsider ratio) were also measured dichotomously, coded 1 
if the ratio of outside to inside directors was greater in the 
current year than in the prior year, and 0 otherwise. 
To analyze the likelihood of increased demographic distance 
between the CEO and the board (increased dissimilarity), we 
first measured CEO-board similarity across several dimen- 
sions for each year. Similarity was assessed in terms of 
three characteristics commonly employed in the top man- 
agement team literature (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
Functional background similarity and education similarity 
were measured with a variant of Blau's (1977) index of 
heterogeneity, defined as (pi)2, where Pi is the proportion of 
CEO-board member dyads sharing the ith category (Murray, 
1989). For functional background, this measure indicates the 
squared proportion of CEO-board member dyads in which 
both individuals have primary experience in the same core, 
functional area (Hambrick and Mason, 1984); for educational 
background, it represents the proportion of such dyads in 
which both individuals possess the same type of degree. 
Following prior research (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), we 
measured degree type as the highest university degree 
obtained in five categories: arts, sciences, engineering, 
management or economics, and law. When specialties were 
not listed, B.S. and M.S. degrees were classified as science 
degrees. Age similarity was measured with an analog of the 
coefficient of variation (Tsui and O'Reilly, 1989): 
ny (Si_ Sj) 211 
where S is the CEO's age, SI indicates the age of directori 
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(excluding the CEO), and n represents the number of board 
members. This measure was converted to an indicator of 
similarity by subtracting each firm's coefficient from the 
highest value in the sample. We then created a dichotomous 
measure of increased demographic distance, coded 1 if 
CEO-board similarity decreased across all three dimensions. 
The results were also unchanged using increased similarity 
along one or more dimensions. To the extent that each of 
the three demographic characteristics indicates different 
attitudes and behavioral tendencies (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984), this composite measure indicates relatively broadly 
based increases in demographic distance between the CEO 
and the board. 
While it is possible to use continuous rather than dichoto- 
mous measures of some of the dependent variables, we 
chose to use dichotomous measures for two reasons: (1) 
our theoretical argument implies that the increase in board 
independence itself (i.e., even a small one) is a meaningful 
event, since it requires a fundamental change in how 
CEO-directors perceive the CEO-board relationship; and (2) 
the range of size in such increases is very restricted for 
most of our dependent variables and highly correlated with 
the dichotomous measures. For instance, boards rarely 
increase the outsider ratio by adding more than two individu- 
als to the board, so that the magnitude of such increases is 
very similar across cases. 
Compensation contingency. Compensation contingency 
was calculated for each year as the total value of long-term 
incentive grants divided by total direct compensation. Stock 
options were valued using the Black-Scholes (1 973) method, 
which estimates option value based on the historical price 
volatility of the underlying security. Other grants (e.g., 
restricted stock, performance shares) were valued according 
to the market price at date of grant (Crystal, 1984). All 
compensation values were adjusted for inflation to represent 
1990 constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index. To 
analyze the likelihood of increased compensation contin- 
gency (increased contingency), we created a dichotomous 
measure, coded 1 in a particular year if compensation 
contingency increased from the prior year, and 0 otherwise. 
Diversification. To test hypotheses on change in unrelated 
diversification, we used Palepu's (1985) entropy measure, 
which takes into account the number of segments in which 
a firm operates and weights each segment according to its 
contribution to total sales. It is defined as follows: 
n 
XPi * ln(1/Pt), 
i= 1 
where P is the dollar value of sales attributed to segment i 
and In(1I/P) is the weight for each segment i, or the loga- 
rithm of the inverse of its sales. Reduced diversification was 
operationalized as an absolute decrease in the entropy 
measure of .10 or more, to capture relatively significant 
change and to exclude change that reflects random alter- 
ations in segment sales levels. The results were similar 
when we operationalized reduced diversification as an 
absolute decrease in the entropy measure of .05 or more. 
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Independent Variables 
The proportion of outside directors who were CEO-directors 
was assessed simply as the number of outside directors 
currently then also serving as chief executive at another 
Fortune or Forbes 500 company, divided by the total number 
of outsiders on the board. To measure the proportion of 
outside CEO-directors who had experienced increased board 
independence in their home companies, we created five 
independent variables, three for board structure and one 
each for diversification and compensation contingency. Each 
indicates the number of outside CEO-directors erving as 
CEO at another Fortune or Forbes 500 company who have 
also experienced change along the relevant dimension within 
the past two years, divided by the total number of outsiders 
on the board. The results were generally robust to different 
lags, such as one year or three years. 
In separate analyses we operationalized the presence of 
CEO-directors as the absolute number of such directors on 
the board, rather than as the proportion of outsiders. The 
results were substantively unchanged. Because our argu- 
ment implicity compares the social obligations of CEO- 
directors to those of other outsiders, we used the propor- 
tional measure in the final models presented below. 
Controls 
We controlled for the possibility that more traditional network 
diffusion processes involving imitation or social learning 
could influence the diffusion of increased board indepen- 
dence (e.g., Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Davis, 1991; 
Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). 
According to this perspective, organizations are more likely 
to adopt an innovation when they have director ties to prior 
adopters, because such contacts help resolve uncertainty 
about the consequences of adoption (Davis, 1991). As noted 
by Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993), directors who have 
participated in a particular structural, strategic, or policy 
change at other firms may become more forceful advocates 
of such change because they have behaviorally committed 
themselves to it. These directors may also be more persua- 
sive in advocating change because they can provide vivid, 
firsthand accounts of how the innovation affected organiza- 
tional processes and outcomes (Davis, 1991). Overall, 
according to this perspective, director ties serve as "informa- 
tion conduits" that facilitate imitation and learning, largely 
because information provided by fellow corporate leaders 
may be trusted more than information derived from other 
sources (Davis, 1991: 594; Haunschild, 1993; Mizruchi, 
1996). This would suggest that CEO-directors' experience 
with increased board independence at other firms may 
increase the likelihood of such change at the focal firm 
simply by providing information that encourages imitation. 
Thus, to distinguish the social exchange explanation for 
diffusion from this more traditional explanation, we controlled 
for the prior experience CEO-directors had with increases in 
board independence while serving as outside directors on 
other boards. Specifically, we developed a set of variables to 
indicate the number of outside CEO-directors who experi- 
enced change along the relevant dimension as an outside 
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director at a Fortune or Forbes 500 company other than their 
home company within the previous two years, divided by 
the total number of outsiders on the board. Significant 
effects for these variables would provide evidence consis- 
tent with the typical imitation or learning perspective on 
diffusion through interlocks. The absence of significant 
effects for these variables, together with support for the 
hypotheses, would provide evidence consistent with the 
social exchange perspective on diffusion developed in this 
study. 
Because pressure from institutional investors is commonly 
considered a primary external determinant of increased 
board control and reduced diversification, as discussed 
above, we included institutional investor ownership as a 
control variable in all models (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). 
Institutional ownership was defined as equity held by 
pension funds, banks and trust companies, savings and 
loans, mutual fund managers, and labor union funds divided 
by total common stock (Hansen and Hill, 1991). 
There is some research suggesting that poorly performing 
organizations are more likely to separate the CEO and board 
chair positions (Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988) and to 
appoint outsiders to the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1988). Prior firm performance may also be related to 
subsequent changes in compensation contingency (Westphal 
and Zajac, 1994) and diversification (Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992). Thus we included two measures of firm performance 
(return on assets and excess stock returns) as control 
variables in all analyses. 
In addition, because there is some evidence for relationships 
between firm size and various dimensions of board structure 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994), 
diversification (Bergh, 1995), and compensation contingency 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1994), we included log of sales in all 
analyses. Also, since changes in board structure may affect 
changes in compensation contingency and diversification, we 
controlled for changes in board structure in these specific 
analyses. Finally, we also controlled for industry and time 
effects by including dummy variables indicating primary, 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes, as well as 
dummies for each year in all analyses. To conserve space, 
coefficients for these variables are not reported in the tables. 
Analysis 
Hypotheses were tested using discrete-time event history 
analysis (Allison, 1982, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). Event 
history models are especially appropriate for analyzing 
longitudinal data with time-varying covariates when the 
dependent variable is a discrete event. In this case, the 
events of interest are (1) control-enhancing changes in board 
structure (measured by separation of the CEO and board 
chair positions, increases in the ratio of outside to inside 
directors, and increased demographic distance between the 
CEO and the board); (2) increases in compensation contin- 
gency; and (3) decreases in corporate diversification. Thus 
we developed five models. Changes in board structure, 
compensation contingency, and diversification were ob- 
served from 1983 to 1992, yielding 4,220 firm-years of data. 
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The discrete-time model can be expressed in the following, 
logistic regression form (Allison, 1984): 
log{P,(t)I/1-P,(t)1} = a + bkXik(t-1), 
where Pft) is the probability of change in CEO characteristics 
or increased CEO-board similarity in year t-1, Xls are 
time-varying independent variables hypothesized to influence 
the risk or likelihood of change, and bks are the estimated 
coefficients. Pi is defined as: 
exp[bkXjk(t-1)I/{1 + exp[bkXjk(t-1)I}, 
such that Pj(t) increases monotonically with bkXjk(t-1) and can 
assume any value between zero and one. Given time-varying 
covariates, a firm's likelihood of change is updated over time 
as the values of independent and control variables change. 
As the model indicates, all independent and control variables 
were lagged by one year. 
Since the dependent variables of interest represent relatively 
fundamental and long-lasting alterations in board orientation 
toward the CEO, we model only the likelihood of the first 
event during the time period (i.e., the firm is removed from 
the risk set following adoption of the changes). This is 
consistent with our interest in explaining when and why 
boards began to assert their independence from top man- 
agement; subsequent continued increases in board indepen- 
dence are less central to the study, and we assume they 
represent continuance of the board's new orientation. Also, 
significant reversals across the five dependent variables in 
this study were quite rare. Moreover, for the model of 
CEO-board chair separation, the initial risk set excludes 
cases for which the two positions are already separate. 
Finally, to ensure that the results were not dependent on 
unspecified, time-specific factors, we included year dummy 
variables in all models (Allison, 1982, 1984), as noted above. 
In general, discrete-time models provide an adequate 
approximation of continuous-time models, which estimate 
instantaneous rates of change, when the conditional prob- 
ability of event occurrence is small, e.g., 0.1 or smaller 
(Clogg and Eliason, 1987). In this study, the likelihood of 
change in any given year is less than .1 for all dependent 
measures. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and 
bivariate correlations for all data pooled. The results of event 
history analyses of changes in board structure are shown in 
Table 2. Hi, H2, and H3 predicted a negative association 
between the proportion of the board composed of CEO- 
directors and the likelihood of control-enhancing changes in 
board structure. In general, the results support these 
hypotheses. Consistent with HI, the proportion of the board 
composed of CEO-directors is significantly and negatively 
related to the likelihood of separation of the CEO and board 
chair positions. H3 is also supported: A greater presence of 
CEO-directors on the board significantly diminishes the 
likelihood of a decrease in demographic similarity between 
the CEO and the board. Finally, the results provide some 
support for H2, in that the proportion of the board composed 
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of CEO-directors is negatively related to increases in the 
ratio of outside to inside directors. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 4220) 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 3a 3b 
1. CEO-directors on board .376 .245 
2. CEO-directors experiencing 
change at home company: 
(a) Separation .068 .166 .27 
(b) Increased dissimilarity .071 .161 .23 .21 
(c) Increased outsider ratio .081 .157 .34 .12 .13 
(d) Increased contingency .090 .194 .22 .19 .20 -.29 
(e) Reduced diversification .082 .162 .28 .33 .15 -.25 .12 
3. CEO-directors experiencing 
change as outside director: 
(a) Separation .147 .184 .22 .16 .08 .07 .12 .10 
(b) Increased dissimilarity .167 .172 .29 .13 .22 .13 .10 .13 .09 
(c) Increased outsider ratio .166 .170 .28 .10 .11 .19 .08 .12 .13 .10 
(d) Increased contingency .219 .206 .26 .13 .12 .11 .16 .10 .14 .16 
(e) Reduced diversification .182 .175 .33 .05 .09 .11 .12 .18 .17 .14 
4. Separation .041 .198 -.22 .25 .10 .02 .11 .09 .08 .06 
5. Increased dissimilarity .044 .205 -.20 .14 .34 -.01 .06 .07 .07 .05 
6. Increased outsider ratio .064 .245 -.08 .05 -.13 .18 -.09 -.13 -.02 .04 
7. Increased contingency .089 .286 -.1 1 .12 .12 -.05 .24 .14 .03 .02 
8. Reduced diversification .060 .238 -.26 .15 .07 -.08 .13 .32 .02 .03 
9. Return on assets .068 .050 -.14 .07 .10 -.04 .10 -.03 .01 .04 
10. Excess stock returns .013 .135 -.15 .03 .08 -.09 .07 -.1 1 .02 .02 
11. Log of sales 7.8141 .224 .07 -.02 .03 .03 -.05 .05 -.01 -.01 
12. Institutional ownership .356 .208 -.08 .23 .12 -.02 .19 .15 .00 -.03 
Variables 3c 3d 3e 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
3. CEO-directors experiencing 
change as outside director: 
(d) Increased contingency .07 
(e) Reduced diversification .11 .13 
4. Separation .03 .05 .06 
5. Increased dissimilarity .04 .03 .05 .19 
6. Increased outsider ratio .09 .06 .08 -.14 -.19 
7. Increased contingency -.01 .06 .07 .22 .15 -.25 
8. Reduced diversification .07 .01 .12 .24 .18 -.20 .11 
9. Return on assets -.03 .01 .00 .09 .04 -.06 .07 .05 
10. Excess stock returns -.06 -.02 .04 .13 .12 -.08 .17 .08 .32 
11. Log of sales -.02 .03 .08 .02 -.03 .09 .00 .18 -.1 1 -.14 
12. Institutional ownership .01 -.01 -.04 .09 .13 .16 .08 .20 .07 -.03 .15 
Hla, H2a, and H3a predicted a positive relationship between 
the proportion of the board composed of CEO-directors who 
experienced control-enhancing changes in board structure at 
their home companies and the likelihood of such changes at 
the focal company. The results shown in Table 2 provide 
strong and consistent evidence for these hypotheses. 
Consistent with Hia, separation of the CEO and board chair 
positions is more likely in the presence of CEO-directors 
who have experienced separation themselves. The findings 
also afford strong evidence for H3a: The larger the propor- 
tion of the board composed of CEO-directors who experi- 
enced an increase in demographic distance from the CEO at 
home, the greater the likelihood of such change at the focal 
company. Finally, the results also support H2a: Increases in 
the ratio of outside to inside directors are more likely when 
the board includes CEO-directors who have experienced 
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Table 2 
Event History Analyses of Changes in Board Structure* 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Independent variables Separation Dissimilarity Outsider ratio 
1. CEO-directors on board -4.100- -2.251-- -1.1 96- 
(1.938) (1.062) (.878) 
2. CEO-directors experiencing 1.91 8--- 1.2740--- .593-- 
change at home company (.355) (.239) (.346) 
3. CEO-directors experiencing -.319 .189 -.231 
change as outside director (.570) (.403) (.354) 
4. Return on assets -4.934---- -4.523---- -2.333- 
(1.236) (1.025) (1.391) 
5. Excess stock returns -.089--- -.023 -.049-- 
(.034) (.028) (.022) 
6. Log of sales .064 .057 .187- 
(.124) (.115) (.094) 
7. Institutional ownership 1.230 .543 .446 
(.723) (.411) (.355) 
Constant 2.548--- 4.0360000 4.5320000 
(1.013) (.955) (.767) 
Chi-square 109.120000 97.440000 38.340000 
Number of firm-years 3170 3801 3555 
* p < .10; *- p < .05; 000 p < .01; *-p < .001. 
* Coefficients for industry and year dummy variables are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. T-tests are 
one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
such a change at their home companies. In general, there- 
fore, while the presence of CEO-directors typically prevents 
an increase in board independence, the presence of CEO- 
directors who experienced an increase in independence at 
Table 3 
Event History Analysis of Reduced Diversification* 
Independent variables Unstandardized coefficients 
1. CEO-directors on board -2.499 
(.730)---- 
2. CEO-directors 1.871 
experiencing change (.233)---- 
3. CEO-directors experiencing -.312 
change as outside director (.280) 
4. Return on assets -1.529 
(1.119) 
5. Excess stock returns -.032 
(.023) 
6. Separation .797 
(.241 )--- 
7. Dissimilarity .514 
(.293)- 
8. Outsider ratio 1.019 
(.526)- 
9. Log of sales .018 
(.097) 




Chi-square 1 08.870000 
Number of firm-years 3639 
*p < .10; 0-p < .05; seep < .01; *---p < .001. 
* Coefficients for industry and year dummy variables are not reported. Stan- 
dard errors are in parentheses. T-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, 
two-tailed for control variables. 
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their home companies actually stimulates such a change at 
the focal company. 
The next set of analyses show whether the presence of 
CEO-directors has a comparable effect on two other ex- 
amples of changes in large U.S. corporations: a decrease in 
unrelated diversification and an increase in compensation 
contingency. Table 3 provides the results of event history 
analysis of a decrease in diversification. In support of H4, the 
presence of CEO-directors on the board lowers the likelihood 
of a reduction in diversification. The findings also support 
H4a: The presence of CEO-directors enduring reduced 
diversification at home enhances the likelihood of such 
change at the focal company. The results of event history 
analysis of an increase in compensation contingency are 
provided in Table 4. Consistent with H5, the proportion of 
the board composed of CEO-directors is negatively related to 
the likelihood of an increase in compensation contingency. 
Moreover, the findings afford strong support for H5a: The 
greater the proportion of the board composed of CEO- 
directors who experienced an increase in compensation 
contingency at their home companies, the greater the 
likelihood of such a change in the focal company. 
Finally, the results also indicate that variables included to 
control for more traditional perspectives on interlock diffu- 
sion are consistently nonsignificant. The results in Table 2 
show that a CEO-director's experience with control-enhanc- 
ing changes in board structure as an outside director on 
Table 4 
Event History Analysis of Increased Compensation Contingency* 
Independent variables Unstandardized coefficients 
1. CEO-directors on board -.906 
(.603) 
2. CEO-directors 1.114 
experiencing change (.203)0 
3. CEO-directors experiencing -.120 
change as outside director (.246) 
4. Return on assets -.829 
(1.029) 
5. Excess stock returns -.045 
(.022)0 
6. Separation .461 
(.227)0 
7. Dissimilarity .659 
(.274)0 
8. Outsider ratio .417 
(.371) 
9. Log of sales -.087 
(.076) 





Number of firm-years 3353 
* p < .10; *- p < .05; *-- p < .01; .... p < .001. 
* Coefficients for industry and year dummy variables are not reported. Stan- 
dard errors are in parentheses. T-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, 
two-tailed for control variables. 
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other boards is not significantly related to such a change at 
the focal firm. Similarly, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, the 
likelihood of a reduction in diversification or an increase in 
compensation contingency is not independently affected by 
the presence of CEO-directors who have experienced such a 
change as outside directors at other firms. Overall, then, the 
results provide strongly consistent evidence that the diffu- 
sion of increased board independence and control, as 
manifested by specific changes in board structure, greater 
compensation contingency, and reduced diversification, is 
affected by CEO-directors' experience at the CEOs' home 
companies, consistent with the social exchange perspective, 
but not by CEO-directors' experience as outside directors on 
other boards, contrary to a traditional network diffusion 
perspective. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings provide strong evidence that control-enhancing 
changes in board structure, as well as related changes in 
corporate strategy and executive incentive compensation, 
are influenced by social and psychological dynamics operat- 
ing within the inner circle of corporate leaders. Empirical 
analyses yielded a highly consistent pattern of results 
supporting the theoretical proposition that, although general- 
ized norms of reciprocity among corporate elites may 
typically lead CEO-directors to inhibit organizational changes 
that are contrary to the preferences of fellow top managers, 
CEO-directors actually induce such change when they have 
experienced it themselves. Thus, it appears that the social 
exchange framework can explain the specific conditions 
under which a variety of phenomena that are considered 
aversive to CEOs can spread through the network of 
CEO-directors. 
The first set of findings revealed a negative relationship 
between the proportion of the board composed of CEO- 
directors and the likelihood of changes in board structure. 
This suggests that, consistent with a social exchange model 
emphasizing generalized norms of reciprocity, CEO-directors 
perceive a generalized obligation to support other CEOs. In 
this system of social interaction among status equals, 
sufficient trust exists that CEO-directors believe their 
support for CEOs will be reciprocated indirectly by someone 
else, sometime in the future. This finding is consistent with 
social psychological research showing that group solidarity or 
mutual identification can generate cooperative behavior 
(Dawes, 1992) and that individuals benefiting from prosocial 
acts frequently engage in similar behavior toward generalized 
others, causing helping behavior to spread through a social 
structure (e.g., Krebs and Miller, 1985; Komorita, Hilty, and 
Parks, 1991). Thus the present study provides a theoretical 
explanation and large-sample empirical evidence for how 
board norms emphasizing deference to the CEO that are 
common across firms (Whisler, 1984) can be maintained 
over time. 
At the same time, however, our additional analyses indicated 
that the relative prevalence of directors who experienced an 
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increase in board independence actually increased the 
likelihood of such a change at the focal firm, where they 
appeared to spur, rather than resist, such change. This result 
is consistent with the notion that when generalized ex- 
change partners are no longer of equal status and prestige, 
such inequality may "force a rupture" in the system of 
exchange (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 266), so that social solidarity 
among corporate leaders can provide a context for general- 
ized retaliation or defection, rather than cooperation (cf. 
Gouldner, 1960; Axelrod, 1984). The underlying social 
psychological mechanisms for such defection can also be 
understood from an equity or social comparison perspective 
(Festinger, 1954; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973: 
152), wherein recently disempowered CEOs perceive their 
status as having worsened relative to comparison-other 
CEOs and thus act to reduce their support of other CEOs on 
whose boards they sit. Overall, the results suggest that the 
social and psychological factors relating to the CEO-directors' 
perceived exchange relationship with top managers can 
predict and explain the diffusion of board independence in 
large U.S. corporations. 
Further analyses demonstrate the generalizability of our 
proposed framework for understanding the diffusion of 
defection among a connected set of previously cooperative 
actors. The findings indicate that while the presence of 
CEO-directors typically reduces the likelihood of a decrease 
in unrelated diversification, the presence of CEO-directors 
who have experienced a decrease in diversification at their 
own firms increases the likelihood of such a change at the 
focal company. Furthermore, a very similar pattern of results 
emerges in analyses of increases in compensation contin- 
gency. Thus defection or retaliation among corporate elites 
appears to facilitate the spread of reduced diversification and 
incentive alignment (both of which are manifestations of 
greater board independence), as CEO-directors ubjected to 
such pressures in their home companies diminish their 
resistance or even actively support such change elsewhere 
so as to restore balance to their social exchange relation- 
ships. 
Additional results provided further evidence for this interpre- 
tation by allowing us to rule out alternative explanations. 
While experience with increased board independence at the 
CEO-directors' home companies consistently predicted the 
likelihood of change at the focal firm, we found that CEO- 
directors' experience as outside directors on other boards 
was consistently unrelated to such change (across five 
different indicators). This finding is inconsistent with alterna- 
tive, more conventional perspectives on network diffusion 
emphasizing the role of imitation and social learning (e.g., 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 
1989; Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and 
Zhou, 1993). The diffusion of control-enhancing change in 
board structure does not appear to result simply from the 
spread of information and awareness about such change 
through director ties to other boards. 
The results also suggest that diffusion cannot be described 
here as a process in which directors who participated in 
increasing board control on other boards became socialized 
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into believing that such change is effective, leading them to 
push for it at other companies (cf. Burt, 1987). Instead, 
these additonal findings are consistent with our generalized 
social exchange perspective, according to which CEO- 
directors would not generally seek to spread changes that 
are aversive to CEOs' interests, even if their prior exposure 
to such changes on other boards led them to believe that 
such changes might be desirable for other constituents. 
Rather, CEO-directors will spread such changes only as a 
result of their own experiences as CEOs, which lead them 
to restore balance to social exchange relationships with 
fellow corporate leaders that have been disturbed by the 
CEOs' loss of control over their own boards. Moreover, our 
focus on CEO-directors enables a precise comparison of 
home company vs. outside director experience, since any 
observed differences cannot be attributed to differences in 
the kind of director studied. 
We also conducted a separate test of the learning-based 
alternative explanation for our results. Conventional perspec- 
tives on diffusion might suggest that directors experienced 
with increased board independence might spread such 
practices to improve firm performance where it is poor. To 
test this notion, we estimated supplementary models that 
included interactions between CEO-director experience and 
prior performance of the focal company. The results of these 
analyses were consistently insignificant and thus did not 
support the alternative explanation. These results provide 
stronger evidence that the observed effect of CEO-director 
experience reflects the proposed social exchange factors, 
rather than economic considerations or learning. 
Our findings stress the importance of social and psychologi- 
cal forces within the inner circle, rather than emphasizing 
how external forces influence a cohesive class of managerial 
elites. The findings not only support the social exchange 
mechanism, which operates within corporate elites, but they 
also show that ownership by institutional investors is only 
weakly related to the governance and strategic changes 
analyzed in this study. It may be that external forces play a 
more significant role in precipitating diffusion (cf. Fligstein, 
1991) by prompting initial defections. Further, the relatively 
active market for corporate takeovers of the early to mid- 
1980s may have created a political atmosphere conducive 
to diminished elite solidarity (Davis and Thompson, 1994), 
thus precipitating initial defections. It is important to note, 
however, that we observe the spread of defection through 
the network of heretofore mutually supportive corporate 
leaders continuing well beyond the period of widespread and 
significant takeover threat to large corporations. 
Our perspective suggests an alternative behavioral mecha- 
nism by which changes in governance arrangements, 
corporate strategy, and possibly other organizational phe- 
nomena spread across organizations. While existing theoreti- 
cal perspectives on network diffusion highlight the role of 
communication in facilitating the spread of organizational 
phenomena (Rogers, 1983; Davis, 1991), our perspective 
emphasizes the role of changing social obligations in driving 
diffusion: CEO-directors do not support greater board control 
because they know it to be a legitimate or effective change 
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in governance arrangements from sitting on boards that have 
made similar changes but because their experience with 
increased board control in their home corporations has 
changed their generalized social exchange relationship with 
fellow CEOs. Defection restores balance to the social 
exchange relationship, while supporting other CEOs at the 
same level would only maintain the new and unequal status 
quo. 
Our study also sheds light on the specific form of defection. 
Gouldner (1960: 172) suggested that reciprocity is often 
"homeomorphic" or "identical in form . . . with respect to 
the things exchanged [and] the circumstances under which 
they are exchanged." Additional analyses suggested that the 
presence of CEO-directors who experienced one kind of 
increase in board independence at their home companies 
generally did not increase the likelihood of different kinds of 
increases elsewhere. CEOs experiencing the separation of 
CEO and board chair positions, for example, were likely to 
induce that specific change but not the other changes 
examined in this study. Thus it appears that CEO-directors 
tend toward homeomorphic retaliation as a response to 
increased board independence at their home companies. 
The network of CEO-directors examined in this study shares 
certain characteristics with a positive social exhange net- 
work, as conceived by Cook and Emerson (1978: 725), in 
that exchange, or the use of power in one relation, is 
contingent upon exchange in the other relation. Whereas 
equity concerns are static and restrain the use of power in 
Cook and Emerson's model, however, we view equity as a 
dynamic, social psychological mechanism that can facilitate 
as well as inhibit the exercise of power. 
While the theory developed in this study is not concerned 
directly with the notion of trust, some might interpret our 
findings as counter to the notion that trust governs most 
interpersonal and interorganizational relationships. Relation- 
ships with trust, however, are neither extremely fragile nor 
impervious to change, and we propose, consistent with 
Axelrod (1984), that trust among exchange partners is most 
robust under stable environmental conditions and least 
robust under circumstances of substantial contextual 
disruptions. The latter condition more accurately describes 
the period under study. To the extent that there are fewer 
external disruptions in the corporate governance arena over 
the next ten years, there may be fewer defections. 
This study does not suggest, moreover, that board indepen- 
dence has become universal among large firms. Zajac and 
Westphal (1996) provided evidence suggesting that, in 
recent years, managers may have used their influence over 
the director selection process to avoid the potential for 
increases in board independence. They found that powerful 
CEOs favor the selection of directors who have not experi- 
enced increases in board independence, thus avoiding 
directors who are at risk of defecting. Conversely, boards 
that have already asserted their independence are more 
likely to appoint new directors who have experienced 
increases in independence. Overall, then, it is not obvious 
that board norms favoring independence and control have 
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universally replaced norms favoring passivity and support. 
Both sets of norms can be found across boards of large 
firms, and mechanisms such as director selection are used 
to reinforce them. Ironically, the emergence of board control 
as a viable, competing norm may have raised solidarity or 
group awareness among those boards adhering to the old 
norms of support, even as it raises the prospect of defec- 
tion. By recognizing the existence of social forces for 
stability and for change in corporate governance practices, as 
well as the role of the intercorporate network in impeding 
and impelling such changes, researchers can develop a 
greater understanding of seemingly inconsistent arguments 
and results regarding the control of U.S. corporations. 
REFERENCES 
Allison, Paul D. 
1982 "Discrete-time methods for 
the analysis of event histo- 
ries." In S. Leinhardt (ed.), 
Sociological Methodology: 
61-98. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
1984 Event History Analysis. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Amihud, Yakov, and Baruch Lev 
1981 "Risk reduction as a manage- 
rial motive for conglomerate 
mergers." Bell Journal of 
Economics, 12: 605-617. 
Axelrod, Robert 
1984 The Evolution of Cooperation. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Baysinger, Barry, and Robert E. 
Hoskisson 
1990 "The composition of boards of 
directors and strategic control: 
Effects on corporate strat- 
egy." Academy of Manage- 
ment Review, 15: 72-87. 
Beatty, Randolph P., and Edward 
J. Zajac 
1994 "Top management incentives, 
monitoring, and risk sharing: A 
study of executive compensa- 
tion, ownership and board 
structure in initial public 
offerings." Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 39: 
313-336. 
Bergh, Donald P. 
1995 "Size and relatedness of units 
sold: An agency theory and 
resource-based perspective." 
Strategic Management 
Journal, 16: 221-239. 
Bethel, Jennifer E., and Julia 
Liebeskind 
1993 "The effects of ownership 
structure on corporate 
restructuring." Strategic 
Management Journal, 14: 
15-32. 
Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes 
1973 "The pricing of options and 
corporate liabilities." Journal 
of Political Economy, 81: 
637-659. 
Blau, Peter M. 
1977 Inequality and Heterogeneity. 
Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Burt, Ronald S. 
1987 "Social contagion and innova- 
tion: Cohesion versus struc- 
tural equivalence." American 
Journal of Sociology, 92: 
1287-1335. 
Business Week 
1994 "How to handle a CEO." 
February 21: 56-61. 
Clogg, Clifford C., and Scott R. 
Eliason 
1987 "Some common problems in 
log-linear analysis." Sociologi- 
cal Methods and Research, 
15: 8-44. 
Collins, Randall 
1990 Theoretical Sociology. New 
York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Cook, Karen S., and Richard M. 
Emerson 
1978 "Power, equity and commit- 
ment in exchange networks." 
American Sociological Review, 
43: 721-739. 
Crystal, Graef S. 
1984 Questions and Answers on 
Executive Compensation. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren- 
tice-Hall. 
1991 In Search of Excess: The 
Overcompensation of Ameri- 
can Executives. New York: 
W.W. Norton. 
Daily, Catherine M. 
1996 "Governance patterns in 
bankruptcy reorganizations." 
Strategic Management 
Journal, 17: 355-375. 
Davis, Gerald F. 
1991 "Agents without principles? 
The spread of the poison pill 
through the intercorporate 
network." Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 36: 
583-613. 
1992 "The interlock network as a 
self-reproducing social 
structure." Paper presented at 
the Advancement of Socio- 
Economics Annual Confer- 
ence, Irvine. 
Davis, Gerald F., and Tracy A. 
Thompson 
1994 "A social movement perspec- 
tive on corporate control." 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 39: 141-173. 
Dawes, Robyn M. 
1992 "Social dilemmas, economic 
self-interest, and evolutionary 
theory." In Donald R. Brown 
and J.E. Keith Smith (eds.), 
Recent Research in Psychol- 
ogy: Frontiers of Mathematical 
Psychology: 1-27. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. 
Powell 
1983 "The iron cage revisited: 
Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in 
organizational fields." Ameri- 
can Sociological Review, 48: 
147-1 60. 
Ekeh, Peter P. 
1974 Social Exchange Theory: The 
Two Traditions. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Festinger, Leon 
1954 "A theory of social compari- 
son processes." Human 
Relations, 7: 117-140. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. 
Jensen 
1983 "The separation of ownership 
and control." Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26: 301-325. 
181/ASQ, March 1997 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:22:32 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Finkelstein, Sydney, and Richard 
A. D'Aveni 
1994 "CEO duality as a double- 
edged sword: How boards of 
directors balance entrench- 
ment avoidance and unity of 
command." Academy of 
Management Journal, 37: 
1079-1108. 
Fligstein, Neil 
1991 "The structural transformation 
of American industry: An 
institutional account of the 
causes of diversification." In 
Walter W. Powell and Paul J. 
DiMaggio (eds.), The New 
Institutionalism in Organiza- 
tional Analysis: 311-337. 
Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Fortune 
1993 "The king is dead: Why more 
boards are waking up and 
pushing out the CEO." 
January 11: 34-50. 
Fredrickson, James W., Donald C. 
Hambrick, and S. Baumrin 
1988 "A model of CEO dismissal." 
Academy of Management 
Review, 13: 255-270. 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph, and Stanley 
Wasserman 
1989 "Mimetic processes within an 
interorganizational field: An 
empirical test." Administrative 
Science Quaterly, 34: 454- 
479. 
Gibbs, Philip A. 
1993 "Determinants of corporate 
restructuring: The relative 
importance of corporate 
governance, takeover threat, 
and free cash flow." Strategic 
Management Journal, 14: 
51-68. 
Gouldner, Alvin W. 
1960 "The norm of reciprocity: A 
preliminary statement." 
American Sociological Review, 
25: 161-178. 
Hambrick, Donald C., and Phyllis 
P. Mason 
1984 "Upper echelons: The 
organization as a reflection of 
its top managers." Academy 
of Management Review, 2: 
193-206. 
Hansen, Gary S., and Charles 
W. L. Hill 
1991 "Are institutional investors 
myopic? A time series study 
of four technology-driven 
industries." Strategic Manage- 
ment Journal, 12: 1-16. 
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv 
1979 "Some results on incentive 
contracts with imperfect 
information." Journal of 
Economic Theory, 20: 231- 
259. 
Harrison, J. Richard, David L. 
Torres, and Sal Kukalis 
1988 "The changing of the guard: 
Turnover and structural 
change in the top-manage- 
ment positions." Administra- 
tive Science Quarterly, 33: 
211-232. 
Haunschild, Pamela R. 
1993 "Interorganizational imitation: 
The impact of interlocks on 
corporate acquisition activity." 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 38: 564-592. 
Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach 
1988 "The determinants of board 
composition." Rand Journal of 
Economics, 19: 589-605. 
Herman, Edward S. 
1981 Corporate Control, Corporate 
Power. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hill, Charles W. L., and Scott A. 
Snell 
1988 "External control, corporate 
strategy, and firm perfor- 
mance in research-intensive 
industries." Strategic Manage- 
ment Journal, 9: 577-590. 
Jensen, Michael C. 
1989 "The eclipse of the public 
corporation." Harvard Busi- 
ness Review, 67: 61-74. 
Jensen, Michael C., and Kevin J. 
Murphy 
1990 "Performance pay and 
top-management incentives." 
Journal of Political Economy, 
98: 225-263. 
Kerr, Jeffrey L., and Leslie Kren 
1992 "Effect of relative decision 
monitoring on chief executive 
officer compensation." 
Academy of Management 
Journal, 35: 370-397. 
Kim, Hyosun, and William Ocasio 
1995 "Investor exit, investor voice: 
Institutional investor, perfor- 
mance monitoring, and CEO 
succession." Working Paper, 
MIT. 
Komorita, S. S., J. A. Hilty, and 
C. D. Parks 
1991 "Reciprocity and cooperation 
in social dilemmas." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 35: 
494-518. 
Kosnik, Rita D. 
1987 "Greenmail: A study of board 
performance in corporate 
governance." Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 32: 
163-185. 
Krebs, Dennis L., and D. T. Miller 
1985 "Altruism and aggression." In 
Gardner Lindzey and Elliot 
Aronson (eds.), The Handbook 
of Social Psychology, 1: 1-26. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Lawler, Edward E. 
1990 Strategic Pay: Aligning 
Organizational Strategies and 
Pay Systems. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude 
1969 The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Lorsch, Jay W., and Elaine 
MacIver 
1989 Pawns or Potentates: The 
Reality of America's Corporate 
Boards. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Mace, Myles L. 
1971 Directors: Myth and Reality. 
Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Main, Brian G., Charles A. O'Reilly 
l1l, and James Wade 
1995 "The CEO, the board of 
directors and executive 
compensation: Economic and 
psychological perspectives." 
Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 4: 293-332. 
Marris, Robert L. 
1964 The Economic Theory of 
Managerial Capitalism. 
London: MacMillan. 
Mizruchi, Mark S. 
1996 "What do interlocks do? An 
analysis, critique, and assess- 
ment of research on interlock- 
ing directorates." Annual 
Review of Sociology, 22: 
271-298. 
Murray, Alan I. 
1989 "Top management heteroge- 
neity and firm performance." 
Strategic Management 
Journal, 10: 125-141. 
Palepu, Krishna G. 
1985 "Diversification strategy, profit 
performance, and the entropy 
measure." Strategic Manage- 
ment Journal, 6: 239-255. 
182/ASQ, March 1997 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:22:32 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Defections 
Palmer, Donald A., P. Devereaux 
Jennings, and Xueguang Zhou 
1993 "Late adoption of the multidi- 
visional form by large U.S. 
corporations: Institutional, 
political, and economic 
accounts." Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 38: 
100-13 1. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey 
1972 "Size and composition of 
corporate boards of direc- 
tors." Administrative Science 
Quaterly, 17: 218-228. 
Rogers, Everett M. 
1983 Diffusion of Innovations. New 
York: Free Press. 
Sundaramurthy, Chamu 
1996 "Corporate governance within 
the context of antitakeover 
provisions." Strategic Man- 
agement Journal, 17: 377- 
394. 
Tsui, Anne S., and Charles A. 
O'Reilly 
1989 "Beyond simple demographic 
effects: The importance of 
relational demography in 
superior-subordinate dyads." 
Academy of Management 
Journal, 32: 402-423. 
Turban, Daniel B., and Allan P. 
Jones 
1988 "Supervisor-subordinate 
similarity: Types, effects, and 
mechanisms." Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 73: 
228-234. 
Useem, Michael 
1984 The Inner Circle. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Vancil, Richard F. 
1987 Passing the Baton: Managing 
the Process of CEO Succes- 
sion. Boston: Harvard Busi- 
ness School Press. 
Walsh, James P., and James K. 
Seward 
1990 "On the efficiency of internal 
and external corporate control 
mechanisms." Academy of 
Management Review, 15: 
421-458. 
Walster, Elaine, Ellen Berscheid, 
and G. William Walster 
1973 "New directions in equity 
research." Journal of Person- 
ality and Social Psychology, 
25: 151-176. 
Wayne, Sandy J., and Robert C. 
Liden 
1995 "Effects of impression 
management on performance 
ratings: A longitudinal study." 
Academy of Management 
Journal, 38: 232-260. 
Westphal, James D., and Edward 
J. Zajac 
1994 "Substance and symbolism in 
CEOs' long-term incentive 
plans." Administrative Science 
Quaterly, 39: 367-390. 
1995 "Who shall govern? CEO/ 
board power, demographic 
similarity, and new director 
selection." Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 40: 60-83. 
1997 "The symbolic management 
of stockholders: Corporate 
governance reforms and 
shareholder reactions." 
Working Paper, University of 
Texas at Austin. 
Wiersema, Margarethe F., and 
Karen A. Bantel 
1992 "Top management team 
demography and corporate 
strategic change." Academy 
of Management Journal, 35: 
91-121. 
Whisler, Thomas J. 
1984 Rules of the Game: Inside the 
Board Room. Homewood, IL: 
Dow-Jones Irwin. 
Yamaguchi, Kazuo 
1991 Event History Analysis. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Zahra, Shaker A., and John A. 
Pearce 
1989 "Boards of directors and 
corporate financial perfor- 
mance: A review and integra- 
tive model." Journal of 
Management, 15: 291-334. 
Zajac, Edward J., and James D. 
Westphal 
1996 "Director reputation, CEO- 
board power, and the dynam- 
ics of board interlocks." 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 41: 507-529. 
183/ASQ, March 1997 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:22:32 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
